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Abstract 
This article surveys institutional experimentation that has emerged internationally in response 
to the contraction of the traditional model of employment protection. Various initiatives are 
analysed according to the particular challenges they are designed to address: the emergence 
of non-standard employment contracts; increasing sources of labour supply engaging in non-
standard work; intensification of exogenous pressures on the employment relationship; the 
growth of intermediaries that separate the management from the control of labour; and the 
emergence of entities that subvert the employment relationship entirely. Whereas post-war 
industrial relations scholars characterised the traditional regulatory model as a ‘web of rules’, 
we argue that nascent institutional experimentation is indicative of an emergent ‘patchwork 
of rules’. The identification of such experimentation is instructive for scholars, policymakers, 
workers’ representatives and employers seeking solutions to the contraction of the traditional 
regulatory model. 
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Introduction 
The post-war emergence of the standard employment relationship in the form of full-time 
ongoing employment contracts represented progressive innovations that provided workers in 
advanced economies with income, job and social security (Fudge, 2017). In Britain, the 
proportion of workers covered by the standard employment relationship has declined in 
recent decades (Brown and Wright, 2018). This development is also evident in many other 
advanced economies especially, though not exclusively, the ‘Anglo-American’ or liberal 
market economies (Kochan and Riordan, 2016).  
At the same time, ‘non-standard’ forms of paid work, in particular, have increased. These 
include temporary and fixed-term arrangements where employment protections are typically 
contingent and ‘market-mediated’ contracts where such protections are absent (Kalleberg, 
2011). These trends have been further enabled and enhanced by online platforms and the rise 
of the so called ‘sharing’ or ‘gig’ economy (World Economic Forum, 2018). The purpose of 
this article is to survey the various disparate forms of institutional experimentation for 
protecting employment conditions. It aims to provide insights into how policymakers, 
workers’ representatives and responsible employers have responded to the decline of the 
standard employment relationship. It addresses calls to move beyond traditional modes of 
understanding and analysis focusing on a “gloomy landscape” (Las Heras, 2018) to analyse 
“a more dynamic and diverse array of regulatory systems” (Wright et al., 2017b: 246). 
The growth of non-standard employment has been underpinned by a fracturing of the 
mechanisms that traditionally sustained the standard employment relationship, particularly 
union representation and sectoral collective bargaining. Several factors have driven these 
changes. First, the internationalisation and fragmentation of business activity and ownership 
has greatly increased product and financial market competition, while weakening the 
bargaining power of traditionally organised labour. This has driven changes in how business 
contractually engages its workforce (Brown, 2008; Rubery, 2015). Second, information, 
communication, manufacturing and transportation technologies have transformed supply 
chains (Trevor, 2016). This has facilitated flexible forms of accumulation, with production, 
distribution and finance increasingly enmeshed within global networks (Castells, 1996; 
Harvey, 2011; Silver, 2003). Third, the period of ‘austerity’ following the global financial 
crisis led to downward pressure on wages and a marked increase in contingent forms of work 
(Schömann and Clauwaert, 2012). Bailout agreements for crisis-stricken economies, 
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including Greece, Ireland and Portugal, were conditional on labour market reforms that 
promoted non-standard employment (Colfer, 2018). Finally, changes in the contractual forms 
and regulation of work are often presented as inevitable outcomes of global competition. 
However, they reflect the dominant ideology of employers (Dundon et al., 2010) and the 
conscious legislative enhancement of employer power (Baccaro and Howell, 2017; 
McLaughlin and Wright, 2018). 
A distinguishing feature of non-standard forms of work, and indeed the essential reason why 
they are considered non-standard, is their tenuous relationship to the institutions that 
traditionally regulate labour standards (Fudge, 2017). These forms of work essentially fall 
outside the traditional ‘web of rules’ that post-war industrial relations scholars defined as the 
terms and conditions governing relationships between businesses and workers. These rules 
were negotiated jointly by the parties at the workplace or by their industry representatives 
within the parameters of regulations set down by the state. In countries with a collective 
laissez-faire tradition such as the UK, the involvement of unions and industry associations 
was of great importance.  
The concept of a ‘web of rules’ was first introduced by Kerr and Siegal (1955) and developed 
further by John Dunlop (1958) who defined it as the substantive norms and procedural 
institutions, both formal and informal, that govern work relations (see also Adams, 1977; 
Clegg and Bain, 1974). These scholars conceived their ideas in a pluralist context in which, 
across virtually all Western economies, the workforce was strongly unionised and collective 
bargaining (or similar joint or tripartite arrangements) was the standard process through 
which the web of rules was determined. Because collective bargaining generally operated on 
an inclusive basis covering most workers and workplaces, it produced a web of rules that was 
dominant or ‘systematic’. With the decline of both collective bargaining and an increase in 
non-standard employment, this ‘traditional’ web of rules has contracted to cover a decreasing 
share of the workforce.  
Several commentators note that the increasing trend in non-standard employment has been 
misinterpreted to represent a permanent breakdown in the standard employment relationship, 
when in fact it remains the dominant form of employment in most advanced economies 
(Adams and Deakin, 2014; Fudge, 2017). Despite its traditional association with declining 
industries such as manufacturing, many of the foundational characteristics of the standard 
employment relationship remain evident in service industry jobs. This includes jobs in front-
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line services where firms typically exhibit strong preferences for flexible work arrangements 
that cater to the needs of customers and service recipients (Belanger and Edwards, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the standard employment relationship has undergone a degree of adjustment, as 
have the methods of regulation. As work relations have become more market mediated, new 
institutional arrangements have developed to govern them. This has resulted in an emergent 
patchwork of rules encompassing joint union-employer regulation, non-union regulation and 
statutory regulation.  
The focus of this article is to survey ‘institutional experimentation’ (CRIMT, 2017; 
Kristensen and Morgan, 2012) occurring internationally to enhance employment protections 
in response to the rise of non-standard forms of work. Our analysis draws on the existing 
research and knowledge base of the authors as well as a thorough review of the extant 
literature relating to key themes identified through this review. These themes are: non-
standard employment contracts; sources of labour supply engaging in non-standard work; 
intensification of exogenous pressures on the employment relationship; the growth of 
intermediaries that separate the management from the control of labour; and the emergence of 
entities that subvert the employment relationship entirely. 
The next section of this article briefly outlines the emergent patchwork of rules we have 
identified. The remainder of the article focuses on five manifestations of the contraction of 
the traditional web of rules and the institutional experimentation with innovative forms of 
employment protection emerging internationally in the context of this contraction. The 
conclusion considers the implications of our findings for scholarship and practice. 
 
From a systematic web of rules towards an emergent patchwork of rules 
The traditional systematic web of rules, namely standard employment contracts and the joint 
regulation mechanisms such as collective bargaining that traditionally sustained them, remain 
prominent in many countries. Thus, one solution to the contraction of the traditional systemic 
web of rules is to seek its restoration through policy change. In China, recent studies have 
shown that unions still retain capacity to improve the terms and conditions of the workers 
they represent (Chang and Cooke, 2018). Belgium and the Scandinavian countries provide 
models for extending collective bargaining in a Western context. However, extensive 
collective bargaining coverage and union membership in these countries are partly 
 6
consequences of, firstly, the Ghent model of unemployment insurance that encourages 
workers to join unions and, secondly, a longstanding commitment by employers to social 
partnership (Ebbinghaus et al., 2011). Like the Chinese example, the institutional features of 
the Belgian and Scandinavian systems are absent from liberal market economies such as the 
UK and would be difficult to replicate (McLaughlin, 2013). This difficulty of replication 
arises from the unwillingness of the state to provide workers with procedural power. In China 
unions are effective because they are closely associated with the Communist Party and the 
state and used by them to redistribute profits to workers with government backing (Lee et al., 
2014). In Western European countries with effective sectoral bargaining unions are still 
embedded in government processes at the highest level. This enables enforcement of sectoral 
agreements (Ebbinghaus et al., 2011).  
During the 1980s and 1990s, governments in liberal market economies did not see fit to 
preserve sectoral bargaining structures first instituted at times of depression or war. 
Nevertheless, this has not prevented recent attempts to strengthen more traditional regulatory 
mechanisms in some of these countries. For instance, the Labour-led coalition government in 
New Zealand is considering introducing sectoral bargaining mechanisms to set minimum 
standards across low-paid occupations and industries. Ireland has recently strengthened 
collective bargaining rights. Australia has maintained the award system that provides 
occupationally-specific protections to around 60 per cent of the workforce despite union and 
collective bargaining decline (McLaughlin and Wright, 2018).  
However, the conditions enabling extensive coverage by the traditional web of rules have 
receded in most countries. With some exceptions particularly in labour markets with minimal 
exposure to product market competition (Brown et al., 2009), collective bargaining is in 
decline everywhere and unlikely to be reversed anytime soon (Baccaro and Howell, 2017). 
Consequently, we identify three contemporary webs of rules, which together constitute an 
emergent ‘patchwork of rules’. These webs are most easily identified in liberal market 
economies where the contraction of the traditional web of rules has been most pronounced. 
The first is the traditional web of rules of joint regulation through collective bargaining, as 
discussed above.  
The second is a non-unionised web of rules among occupations and industries that have 
experienced considerable growth over the past quarter century. These include white-collar 
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private sector services industries, such as professional services and fast-moving consumer 
goods firms. These sectors are associated with the emergence of human resource 
management and specifically talent management and an associated unitarist ideological 
undercurrent (Geare et al., 2014; Dundon and Rafferty, 2018). The relatively high individual 
bargaining power of professionals that characterise these industries on account of their scarce 
skills and mobility reduces the necessity for union-negotiated and statutory minimum 
standards (Rousseau, 2015; Trevor and Brown, 2014).  
The third web of rules relates to non-unionised lower-skilled occupations, the non-
professional private services sector and industries susceptible to automation and offshoring, 
which shift power equilibrium away from workers towards employers. In many liberal 
market economies (Colvin and Darbishire, 2013) and coordinated market economies such as 
Germany (Sack and Sarter, 2018), the introduction by governments of statutory minimum 
wages and conditions has been aimed primarily at workers in this web, who can no longer 
rely upon unions to protect them. In the European context, EU directives have played an 
important role in strengthening minimum labour standards. Unions have also been able to use 
litigation around individual employment rights to complement rather than substitute for 
collective bargaining (Deakin et al., 2015). While statutory regulation has generally played 
some role in governing the labour market, the past 30 years has seen a significant increase in 
individual employment rights, with governments forced by public pressure to improve 
minimum standards (Colvin and Darbishire, 2013). However, these statutory minimum 
standards have not prevented wage stagnation and the emergence of non-standard contracts, 
which workers in this latter group have struggled to resist owing to their limited bargaining 
power.  
Transcending these three webs of rules is different types of institutional experimentation that 
have emerged in response to the growth of insecure forms of work. In some cases, these are 
initiatives designed specifically to protect workers on non-standard employment contracts, 
rather than generalised standards that would be encompassed by the third web. In other cases, 
institutional experimentation comes in the form of localised or specific initiatives developed 
by workers’ representatives or advocates and/or by socially responsible businesses, typically 
in response to a lack of state regulation. The remainder of this paper focuses on these various 
forms of institutional experimentation.  
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Manifestations of contraction of the traditional web of rules and institutional 
experimentation developed in response 
To analyse the institutional experimentation that has emerged in response to the contraction 
of the traditional systematic web of rules, it is necessary to categorise the manifestations of 
this contraction. We classify these into the five types (summarised in Table 1) and then 
review the institutional innovations aimed at addressing each manifestation of breakdown. 
 
Table 1 Manifestations of contraction of the traditional web of rules and institutional 
experimentation developed in response 
Type of contraction  Manifestations of contraction Institutional experimentation 
1. The emergence of non-
standard forms of 
employment contracts 
 Temporary/casual contracts 
 Fixed-term contacts 
 Zero-hour contracts 
 ‘Market-mediated’ variable 
contracts  
 Pay loadings 
 Differential employer 
taxation to encourage 
secure employment 
 Portable entitlements 
 Flexicurity 
 Labour cooperatives to 
provide greater certainty 
of regular employment 
2. The expansion of sources 
of labour supply engaging 
in contingent work, e.g. 
workers whose rights/ 
agency are institutionally 
constrained 
 Temporary migrant workers 
with restricted employment 
rights/mobility 
 Younger workers 
 Workers with care 
responsibilities with 
restricted working hours 
capacity 
 Community unions 
 Worker centres 
 Living wage campaigns 
 Social media facilitated 
networks and other forms 
of digital technology to 
represent younger 
workers, migrant 
workers, gig workers 
3. The intensification of 
exogenous pressures on the 
employment relationship 
arising from fragmentation 
of production and service 
provision processes 
 Supply chains 
 Franchising 
 Other forms of ‘fissured’ 
work arrangements 
 Financialisation 
 Public sector outsourcing 
 Codes of conduct 
 International framework 
agreements 
 Multi-stakeholder 
initiatives 
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  Supply chain joint 
responsibility initiatives 
 Public procurement 
labour clauses 
4. The growth of 
intermediaries that separate 
the management of labour 
from the control of labour 
 Labour hire contractors 
 Agencies   
 Licensing and registration 
laws 
 Joint industry/union 
agreements to govern 
terms of labour hire 
engagement 
5. The emergence of entities 
that replace the 
employment relationship 
entirely 
 Online platforms associated 
with gig work 
 Contracting arrangements 
that produce ‘dependent 
self-employment’ 
 
 Joint industry/union 
agreements to establish 
standards 
 Legal reforms to extend 
employment-type 
protections  
 
1. Non-standard forms of employment contracts 
The growth of non-standard forms of employment contracts is the first manifestation of the 
breakdown of the traditional web of rules. This includes temporary employment as well as 
other forms of contingent contracts, such as ‘zero hours’, ‘if and when’, ‘on-call’ or 
‘seasonal’ contracts, whereby the employer is not obliged to offer an employee guaranteed 
hours (ILO, 2016; O’Sullivan et al., 2017). Employees engaged on temporary contracts are 
generally under-protected vis-à-vis employees on standard employment contracts. European 
Union directives on part-time, fixed-term and temporary work require equality of treatment. 
However, various exemptions and exclusions mean the directives do not offer the same 
protections to those on non-standard contracts (Deakin, 2014). While employees engaged on 
a fixed-term basis typically receive the same rights and entitlements as permanent employees, 
the defined period of work can provide challenges relating to job and income security 
(Kalleberg, 2009). Engagement through online platforms is a related type of non-standard 
work, but because it does not involve conventional contractual employment as such, we 
discuss this separately below.  
Public pressure in response to the growth of non-standard employment contracts has led some 
governments to introduce legislative restrictions. Restrictions on ‘zero hours’ contracts 
occurred in New Zealand in 2016. Legislation setting ‘banded hours’ of work is set to be 
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introduced in Ireland at the end of 2018, which will guarantee hours of work in line with an 
employee’s recent work patterns. Similar proposals are under consultation in the UK. There 
is other institutional experimentation designed to protect workers engaged on non-standard 
employment contracts, rather than prohibiting or restricting the use of these contracts. This 
approach focusing on protection rather than prohibition accepts there are circumstances 
where flexible work arrangements may be legitimate, particularly when they suit the needs of 
both parties (IPPR, 2018).  
One such example is pay ‘loadings’ or higher rates of hourly pay for workers on temporary or 
fixed-term contracts. Employers are required to pay loadings of 15-25% to ‘casual’ workers 
in Australia. Pay loadings in Australia were introduced to compensate casual workers for 
their lack of access to protections afforded to workers on permanent contracts such as stable 
hours, entitlements and job security. In the UK, the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) (2018) has recommended a 20% loading for employees engaged on zero-hours 
contracts. A higher National Insurance tax contribution could also be introduced for 
employers who engage workers on non-standard contracts (Brown and Wright, 2018). Such 
measures, if designed carefully, can potentially help to ensure that non-standard contracts are 
used only for genuine fixed-term or intermittent assignments. However, some studies have 
cast doubt as to whether policies mandating pay loadings fully meet their objective of 
compensating casual employees for their exclusion from benefits (e.g. Pocock et al., 2004). 
Portable entitlements enabling workers to access benefits accrued from previous engagements 
are another protection mechanism for non-standard workers. Portability schemes exist in 
Germany for paid parental leave and in Australia for long service leave, where they are seen 
as beneficial for attracting workers to industries characterised by short-term work 
engagements, such as construction, business services and community services (ILO, 2016; 
Markey et al., 2016). Similarly, in France, unemployed workers that accept new employment 
are allowed to keep their accumulated unemployment benefits. The introduction of this policy 
in 2014 was seen as enabling greater labour mobility by encouraging workers to accept 
positions they might otherwise be deterred from lest they lose their benefits. In Denmark and 
the Netherlands, flexicurity systems providing training and income protection are another 
innovation designed to encourage flexible labour markets in a manner mutually beneficial to 
businesses and workers (McLaughlin, 2009). Flexicurity has been lauded as model for other 
countries seeking to protect workers while allowing their labour markets to adapt to structural 
change. However, its reliance upon high levels of public spending and the resilience of 
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unique institutional arrangements are likely difficult to replicate elsewhere (Bredgaard and 
Madsen, 2018). Additionally, while flexicurity may be beneficial for the unemployed, its 
ability to reduce the harmful effects of job insecurity has been seriously questioned (Burchell, 
2009). 
Industries characterised by seasonal labour needs such as agriculture also have a genuine 
reliance upon non-standard work arrangements. One solution to this has emerged in Italy, 
France and the Netherlands, where the creation of territorial pacts and labour cooperatives 
allow for the pooling of workers between multiple businesses. This allows employers to 
address intermittent labour requirements while providing workers with job security and 
regularity of work schedules (Regalia, 2013). However, these initiatives may be difficult to 
establish in countries and industries where there is limited coordination between employers 
and where the established presence of profit-seeking intermediaries, such as labour hire 
contractors, limits the scope for such cooperation (Reilly et al., 2018).   
 
2. Expansion of sources of labour supply 
The growth in non-standard forms of employment requires workers who are willing or 
obliged by circumstances to engage in it. This relates to the second manifestation of 
contraction in the traditional web of rules: the expansion of sources of labour supply 
performing temporary and fixed-term employment. This includes workers who seek 
flexibility in their work arrangements. Such flexibility is often not afforded under standard 
employment contacts that might require workers to work a minimum number of hours or to 
be at the workplace during certain times. Workers on non-standard employment contracts 
therefore may actively seek to achieve balance in their work and non-work commitments, not 
necessarily because they lack the agency or bargaining power to obtain a standard 
employment contract. However, there are workers who enter into temporary or fixed term 
contracts precisely because of the difficulties encountered as a result of their labour market 
characteristics (Eichhorst and Marx, 2015). For instance, in around two-thirds of OECD 
countries there is a greater concentration of female workers than male workers in temporary 
employment (OECD, 2016). While there are several possible explanations for this, in many 
countries the burden for family care responsibilities continues to lie with women who may 
seek non-standard employment contracts to fulfil these responsibilities (Vosko, 2010). New 
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technology can enable the scheduling of work to meet variations in demand thereby 
diminishing the possibility for more family-friendly solutions (Rubery, 2015).  
Younger workers may accept non-standard employment contracts either because they do not 
possess the qualifications and experience to obtain a standard contract or, in the case of 
students, to schedule work around their education (ILO, 2016). Migrant workers often have 
difficulty finding secure and high quality employment due to a lack of social and professional 
networks or difficulties getting their qualifications recognised (Anderson, 2010). They may 
also be under pressure to find work in order to subsist, repay migration costs or remit money 
to their families. Temporary migrants may also have their rights and agency institutionally 
constrained by virtue of immigration rules that tie their residency to a single employer or 
mandate certain work arrangements as part of visa conditions (Wright et al., 2017a).  
There has been institutional experimentation to protect these groups of workers engaged in 
non-standard work due to structural constraints or limited opportunities. The organisations 
that have created these innovations vary across national contexts. For instance, unions in the 
UK have developed community alliances to reach difficult to organise migrant workers 
concentrated in occupations defined by intermittent work schedules (Holgate, 2015). In 
Australia and Ireland, unions have created new organisations and online networks to assist 
younger workers who often work in segments of the labour market characterised by weak 
standards enforcement (Colfer, 2018; Nicholson et al., 2017). In the US, worker centres often 
functioning without union support perform a similar protective function particularly among 
migrant workers (Fine and Bartley, 2018). 
Developing relationships with community organisations can thus improve the capacity of 
representative organisations to reach workers in non-standard employment. However, these 
alliances have potential limitations particularly for providing ongoing workplace 
representation (Williams et al., 2011). They should therefore be seen as a complement to 
rather than a substitute for traditional strategies focused on organising and bargaining. 
Nevertheless, community alliances have been central to campaigns designed to improve 
labour standards in industries where the traditional web of rules of standard employment and 
collective bargaining has eroded. For instance, community organisations and worker centres, 
respectively, have been central to the Living Wage campaign in the UK and the Fight for $15 
campaign in the US aimed at convincing employers and local governments to increase pay 
beyond legal minimum rates (Prowse et al., 2017; Fine and Bartley, 2018). 
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In addition, social media networks and other forms of digital technology have allowed unions 
to retain and extend their power by transcending the spatial and temporal boundaries that 
often separate people in temporary non-standard employment, and thereby represent, organise 
and mobilise hard-to-reach young workers, migrant workers and gig workers (Geelan 2015; 
Dencik and Wilkin 2015; Wood et al., 2018b). For instance, as part of the Fight for $15 
movement, unions have used social media to mobilise low-paid workers in the retail and fast 
food sectors, which employ high proportions of young, female, minority ethnic and migrant 
workers (Pasquier and Wood, 2018). In campaigns at Walmart, the use of Facebook, 
YouTube, Twitter and Instagram provided a digital discursive space in which worker 
activists, who were spatially and temporally fragmented across stores and shifts, could 
connect with each other and with union organisers and other activists. Importantly this space 
existed beyond the workplace, which unions were barred from entering, and where workers 
feared punishment if they discussed worker organisation (Wood, 2015).  
At this point, it is useful to emphasise the distinction between mobilising and organising 
activities (McAlevey 2016). Mobilising refers to motivating supporters to take action while 
organising refers to expanding the supporter base by building relationships with non-
supporters. Although social media can benefit both mobilising and organising activities there 
is danger of union officials focusing exclusively on the more immediate potential benefits 
which social media presents for mobilising. Consequently social media could have the 
contradictory effect of further reducing union membership, by pulling attention and resources 
away from organising, even as spectacles of worker collective action seemingly increase. 
Dencik and Wilkin (2015) argue that the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
deployed social media to give the illusion of Fight for $15 being a spontaneous mass 
grassroots worker movement when in reality the campaign was centrally orchestrated with 
only limited worker engagement.  
Therefore, while union experimentation with digital technologies holds great promise, it also 
poses considerable challenges and risks. Over the last two decades the Internet has 
transformed from a fairly open and decentralised patchwork of independent websites towards 
an organisational form increasingly centralised around a handful of closed platforms. Today, 
the digital age is dominated by corporate power with the world’s largest social media 
platforms all privately owned companies which prioritise profit generated through 
advertising, entertainment and data commercialisation (McChesney, 2013). Employers have 
used social media to engage in counter-communication against worker organising and 
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mobilising (Pasquier and Wood, 2018). There is also evidence of employers using social 
media to monitor, suppress and counter union activities and campaigns (Upchurch and 
Grassman, 2015). Thus, digital technologies are by no means a panacea for protecting 
workers engaged in non-standard work.   
 
3. Intensification of exogenous pressures 
Greater market competition and the expansion of financial capital flows have compelled 
organisations to reduce production and overhead costs. This has resulted in a focus by 
organisations on their core competencies and to shift the peripheral aspects of their 
production to contractors and external providers. At the same time, business models such as 
franchising that allow large firms to increase their profitability and financial value through 
external investment have also became more common. These developments reflect a 
‘fissuring’ of work (Weil, 2014), or an intensification of exogenous pressures on the 
employment relationship. This is a third manifestation of contraction of the traditional web of 
rules. Fissured work is where the business activities of an external organisation substantially 
influence the terms of the employment relationship (Marchington et al., 2005; Wright and 
Kaine, 2015).  
These external pressures can create challenges for workers seeking to negotiate better terms 
and conditions. They can undermine compliance with existing labour standards. This is 
particularly the case in liberal market economies, such as the UK, where the nature of 
competition and employment laws make it difficult for unions and small businesses to resist 
the commercial pressures of retailers, franchise owners and other large firms at the apex of 
supply chains (Deakin and Koukiadaki, 2009). Similar pressures operate in the UK public 
sector where the introduction of market conforming principles has opened the public services 
provision to private businesses. This has led to a significant reduction in labour standards and 
union protection (Rubery, 2015) and deprived many low paid women the right to access 
equal pay claims as outsourcing has eliminated potential male comparators (McLaughlin, 
2014). 
Innovations in response to exogenous pressures come in the form of mechanisms that extend 
responsibility for upholding employment protections to ‘lead firms’ that purchase an 
organisation’s products or services such as retailers and franchise owners. While these 
mechanisms are commonly associated with global supply chains and production networks 
 15 
(Anner, 2018), studies have shown how they can be used to reinforce employment 
protections in a domestic context (e.g. Fine and Bartley, 2018; Weil, 2014; Wright and 
Brown, 2013). These mechanisms include:  
 International conventions that businesses voluntarily sign up to. For instance, the 
Global Compact includes the ILO principles on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals contains targets 
around decent work, equal pay and other core international labour standards (Ruggie, 
2013);  
 Business-driven voluntary initiatives, such as codes of conduct implemented 
unilaterally by multinational enterprises affirming commitment to international labour 
standards in their supply chains (Locke, 2013);  
 Framework agreements negotiated with global union federations that provide a 
generally stronger baseline of labour standards for a multinationals’ suppliers and 
subsidiaries (Niforou, 2012);  
 Legal instruments including modern slavery legislation and multilateral agreements to 
regulate standards in global supply chains (Reinecke and Donaghey, 2018); and  
 Labour clauses in government procurement policy to enable public bodies to use their 
purchasing power to raise standards among private contractors (Jaehrling et al., 2018). 
Various trade-offs between these mechanisms aimed at extending responsibility for 
employment protections in fissured work contexts have been identified. For instance, codes 
of conduct have been criticised for being weakly enforced and adopted opportunistically by 
businesses seeking to portray themselves as socially responsible. From this account, workers 
are treated as passive subjects and union rights are largely ignored (Egels-Zanden and Merk, 
2014). However, others have argued codes of conduct potentially enhance supplier 
compliance with traditional regulation and provide protections that did not exist previously 
(Locke, 2013; Ruggie, 2013). Even if codes of conduct do not directly strengthen 
employment protections they can, nevertheless, provide a potential leverage point for labour 
activists to bargain for improvements in pay and working conditions (Alford et al., 2017).  
Union-negotiated framework agreements usually contain stronger protections for regulating 
labour standards than codes of conduct. However, the uptake of framework agreements is 
very limited which indicates structural barriers to convincing multinationals to sign them 
(Papadakis, 2011). Nevertheless, the growing literature on unions and corporate social 
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responsibility indicates that union and worker involvement can potentially help to address 
some of the identified deficiencies of these mechanisms. For instance, unions can provide an 
avenue for collective worker voice that can improve the internal legitimacy of business-
driven mechanisms. Their embedded role can assist in monitoring compliance and in holding 
businesses accountable (Harvey et al., 2017; see also Anner, 2018). 
All of these mechanisms are most often found among brand-sensitive organisations with an 
aversion to reputational damage (Wright and Brown, 2013). This means their application is 
potentially limited in certain contexts, such as in China, where state suppression of traditional 
and social media means businesses are more protected from reputational damage. 
Nevertheless, these mechanisms can be a significant supplement to weakly enforced domestic 
labour protections in China, particularly if they are accompanied by independent audits from 
local labour nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (Huang et al., 2016). In relation to 
public procurement, similar trade-offs emerge with public bodies seeking to balance socially 
responsible outcomes for precarious and low-paid workers against budgetary constraints, the 
interests of other stakeholders and legal obstacles (Jaehrling et al., 2018). 
 
4. Separation of the management of labour from the control of labour 
The growth of intermediaries that separate the management of labour from the control of 
labour, such as labour hire contractors and employment agencies, is the fourth manifestation 
of contraction of the traditional web of rules. This is closely related to the third factor 
mentioned above. The key difference relates to indirect versus direct control over the 
employment relationship. Firms at the apex of supply chains and franchise owners may 
influence employment relations among their suppliers and franchisees indirectly by virtue of 
their commercial power. By contrast, the engagement of a contractor or agency often 
involves an organisation directly engaging another organisation to manage part of its 
workforce, while still maintaining at least a degree of direct control (Johnstone et al., 2012). 
This means that the intermediary rather than the owner of the workplace legally employs 
temporary agency workers. Their employer thus differs from that of their directly employed 
colleagues who they work alongside (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Heery, 2009). This 
fissuring may make it difficult to forge collective identities and workers may struggle to 
identify targets for collective action (Kalleberg, 2000; Heery, 2009). This creates a complex 
scenario for workers who may be unsure as to the nature of their employment and ultimately 
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who their direct employer even is. As Rubery argues, the ramifications are significant: 
“employers, instead of being held accountable, have become increasingly invisible” (2015: 
639).   
Institutional experimentation in this category can be categorised in terms of firstly, the 
creation of new statutory authorities or licencing schemes by government and, secondly, 
regulatory initiatives created jointly between industry and labour. Examples of new schemes 
created by government include the Gangmasters Licencing and Labour Abuse Authority 
created in the UK and similar schemes operating at sub-national jurisdictions in Canada, 
Australia and elsewhere. These initiatives may require labour hire contractors to be licensed 
to operate lawfully, a process that takes account of their track records of legal compliance and 
their likelihood of meeting certain standards. They may also require employers to be 
registered before they can engage contractors (Davies, 2014). Another example comes from 
Ireland, where the taxi industry and all other service providers involved in ‘hire and reward 
services’ operate under an effective single-tier system of regulation that requires anyone 
carrying passengers for money to have a taxi licence. Due to this, ride-sharing platform 
owners such as Uber do not enjoy the same comparative advantage as they do with traditional 
taxi and private hire vehicle operations in other countries. This simple regulatory measure has 
prevented a decline in working conditions in the industry (Maguire and Murphy, 2013).   
Examples of joint regulatory initiatives include agreements between unions and industry 
associations representing employers and intermediaries. For instance, the North Carolina 
Grower’s Association and the Farm Labor Organizing Committee in the US has helped to 
protect the legitimate role that agencies can play in matching the supply of workers 
efficiently to business demand without compromising employment protections (Gordon, 
2016). In the UK’s oil distribution industry, unions and large oil and transportation 
businesses established a scheme aimed at creating greater accountability for the labour and 
safety standards in an industry characterised by organisational fragmentation. The scheme 
provides greater accountability among intermediaries by requiring tanker drivers to obtain a 
‘passport’ certifying their safety competence before they can transport fuel between refineries 
and distribution centres whose commercial demands can influence work practices (Heery et 
al., 2017). 
 
5. Replacement of the employment relationship 
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The fifth manifestation is the emergence of entities that replace the employment relationship 
entirely. These entities include online platforms associated with the gig economy that 
synthesise localised market-clearing mechanisms (Huang and Geelan, 2018; Wood et al., 
2018a) and contracting arrangements that produce ‘dependent self-employment’ (Taylor et 
al., 2017). At the heart of the ‘gig economy’ lies online platforms which automate some core 
management functions and thus enable an on-demand utilisation of labour. These platforms 
provide algorithmic management of labour in terms of both monitoring and disciplining 
workers through rating and reputation systems and workforce task allocation (Rosenblat and 
Stark, 2016; Shapiro, 2018; Wood et al. 2018a). This greatly reduces the control, contracting 
and coordinating costs of using spot markets as an alternative to employment relationships 
(Wood et al., 2016).  
Related to the gig economy is the practice of ‘bogus’, ‘fake’ or ‘dependent’ self-employment, 
which has long been a feature of sectors such as construction and postal delivery but is on the 
rise (Behling and Harvey, 2015; Moore and Newsome, 2018). This practise is utilised by 
employers to “reduce tax liabilities, or employers’ responsibilities” (OECD, 2000: 156). 
‘Fake self-employment’ differs from genuine self-employment in that workers in the first 
category have limited ability to tender contracts, negotiate prices with clients or substitute 
themselves with other workers. Behling and Harvey (2015: 970) point out that such workers 
also often face “substantial continuity of engagement with a single employer over many 
contracts, lack of control over working times, not supplying plant or materials, or obeying 
instructions in everyday routines”. Here there is much discussion and debate as to the 
boundaries between ‘worker’ status and self-employment. As the Taylor report in the UK 
notes, “this is where there is greatest risk of vulnerability and exploitation” (Taylor et al., 
2017: 32). Exploitation is likely to be more evidenced and more dramatic where online 
platforms provide access to low-skilled labour on demand (Wright et al., 2017b: 254). 
When it comes to institutional experimentation in this category, social media has the potential 
to reduce collective organisation costs significantly by enabling the formation of networks 
and reducing the need for bureaucratic organisations (Heckscher and McCarthy, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the limitations acknowledged above, the ease by which workers can 
organise via social media networks has resulted in the existence of extensive self-organised 
worker communities in the gig economy. This collective organisation has been prevalent 
among gig workers despite them working in physical isolation from each other and on a 
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fragmented range of tasks (Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018; Lehdonvirta, 2016; Wood 
et al., 2018b). 
Similar to worker centred platforms such as Glassdoor, a website where current and former 
employees anonymously review businesses and their management, online forms of collective 
organisation can create greater transparency. They can achieve this by enabling the sharing of 
labour market information such as warnings about clients and scams. In some cases they 
engage in deliberate attempts to influence pay through maintaining informal price norms. 
While the ability of such organisation to improve the security of workers engaged by these 
platforms remains limited, these online communities demonstrate the potential for unions to 
link up with pre-existing gig worker networks so as to improve working conditions (Wood et 
al., 2018b). This in turn might foster agreements between unions and platform businesses to 
establish standards for engagements through online platforms (Minter, 2017), and potentially 
spur legal reforms to extend protections associated with the employment relationship to these 
workers (Stewart and Stanford, 2017).  
 
Conclusion 
This article has surveyed the nascent institutional experimentation that is developing in 
advanced economies internationally as part of an emergent ‘patchwork of rules’. This 
experimentation is a reaction to the contraction of the traditional ‘systematic web of rules’ in 
the form of standard employment contracts and supportive mechanisms such as collective 
bargaining. While the traditional web of rules remains strong in some parts of the workforce in 
many countries, other webs of rules such as statutory regulation and determinations between 
individual workers and employers have been created and extended. The institutional 
experimentation emerging in response to the rise of non-standard forms of work provide 
protection, in different ways and in different contexts, for those who engage in this work. Our 
review highlights the requirement of examining ‘institutional intersections’ across 
international, national, sectoral and local units of analysis. It also accounts for supply chains, 
fissured organisational dynamics, intermediaries and online platforms that serve to shape and 
inform the way work is conducted and regulated (Wright et al., 2017b: 252). Equally important 
is an appreciation of the broad range of stakeholders including businesses, community groups, 
NGOs and online communities that can exert influence over how work is governed.   
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An advantage of a review of the institutional experimentation that has emerged in response to 
the contraction of the traditional web of rules is that these are potentially instructive for 
policymakers and other stakeholders seeking solutions to regulatory gaps in employment 
protection. It is noteworthy that institutional experimentation transcends the other webs of 
rules we have identified. That is, while workers’ representatives and/or responsible 
employers have initiated some forms of experimentation, other forms have been created or 
supported by the state. This indicates, firstly, that there is interplay between the different 
webs of rules. Secondly, campaigns or initiatives by workers’ representatives or business 
might lead to regulation by the state. As such, while some forms of institutional 
experimentation may serve as substitutes for a lack of state regulation, other forms may 
complement or drive state regulation. At the same time, we have acknowledged the 
limitations of some of these initiatives. Despite their promise, soft law regulation that relies 
on socially responsible behaviour by employers and activist behaviour aimed at embarrassing 
employers to improve standards do not address fundamental power imbalances in the 
employment relationship. 
While a review of institutional experimentation can potentially provide ideas for replication 
to address similar challenges in other settings, the limits to the realisation of policy transfer 
also need to be acknowledged. Innovations developed in Northern Europe or East Asia, for 
example, may have some appeal to audiences in the Anglo-American liberal market 
economies, but may also be institutionally incompatible. Moreover, innovative approaches 
frequently require a shift of social norms and can be subject to the constraints of institutional 
path dependency (Las Heras, 2018). Some of the initiatives discussed in the article may be 
more effective than others for protecting workers on non-standard contracts, and further 
research is necessary to test their effectiveness including in different contexts. Furthermore, 
while our analysis has included examples of the new strategies developed by businesses, 
unions, governments and NGOs that have influenced institutional experimentation, we have 
not specifically focused on such ‘organisational experimentation’. There is scope for future 
research to examine this organisational experimentation in response to the changing 
regulatory environment more specifically and comprehensively. 
Various scholars have observed that the New Deal, a classic example of institutional 
experimentation designed in response to an earlier crisis of labour regulation, “drew heavily 
on important ideas that had long been waiting in the wings”, but which were not deemed 
necessary prior to the Great Depression (Arthurs, 2013; see also Kochan, 2018). The task 
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ahead for the representatives of government, labour and business is to determine how to adapt 
the emergent patchwork of rules to protect workers from the new vulnerabilities created by, 
for example, employer extraction and exploitation of their individual bio data, social media 
data and, not far off, their personal genome sequence. It is also worth recalling that post-war 
industrial relations scholars defined the web of rules in terms of both the substantive norms 
and procedural institutions that govern work. While our review has focused largely on 
responses to the contraction of substantive rules, equally important for future research is to 
consider experimentation with new institutional procedures that repair, build and allow 
substantive rules to evolve with changing circumstances. 
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